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Abstract 
Building on the growing debate on political determinants of foreign direct 
investment, we investigate the relationship between US political influence and 
the global distribution of China’s outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). 
Using country-level and firm-level datasets of China’s greenfield investment, 
we find strong evidence that Chinese state controlled firms strategically reduce 
investment in host countries under significant political influence of the US. Our 
results are robust to alternative specification and two falsification tests. The 
findings suggest that the Chinese government uses FDI as a way of economic 
diplomacy.  
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The Dissuasive Effect of US Political Influence on Chinese FDI 
during the “Going Global” Policy 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
While earlier studies on host country determinants of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) have mainly focused on economic variables (see Caves 1996; 
Blonigen 2005), recent research begins to take into account the effect of political 
factors, such as military power, economic dominance, and diplomatic relations 
(e.g. Li and Vashchilko 2010; Duanmu 2014). However, one of the noticeable 
gaps in this stream of research is that it does not consider US global dominance, 
and its impact on global FDI distribution. Despite the fact that US global 
political dominance and its advocated economic globalization have defined the 
post-Cold War international political landscape (Layne 2009), the interactions 
between US international coercive power and Chinese economic decisions have 
been rarely examined in the literature. Given China’s emerging and unique 
position in the international political and economic landscape, we theorize a 
strong relationship between US political influence and the current global 
distribution of Chinese’ outward FDI.  
 
China has engaged in economic globalization in recent decades as no other 
country in the world has. Since 2013, it has been the largest trading country in 
the world, and the second largest country in terms of GDP, which makes it a 
central actor in understanding contemporaneous International Political 
Economy (Anderlini and Hornby 2014). One of the components of China’s 
growing power, as well as its increasing integration into the global economy, 
rests on its outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). Although China only 
recently became a source of FDI, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) predicted that China would become the second 
largest source investment after the US in 2015 (Yao and Wang 2014). The 
official policy, labelled as ‘Going Global’ policy, is the result of strong political 
will from the central Chinese government that has shifted China from a passive 
receipt of inward FDI to an active source of outward FDI in the last decade. 
(Figure 1). Our period of study (2005-2010) captures the “boom” in Chinese 
OFDI. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
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The most widely cited literature on China’s OFDI has focused on the 
traditional economic, institutional, and geographical factors of FDI (e.g. 
Buckley et al. 2007; Kolstad and Wiig 2012; Ramasamy, Yeung and Laforet 
2012). Although the role of bilateral political relations in bilateral trade and 
investment flows is considered in political economy literature (Nigh 1985; 
Pollins 1989; Morrow, Siverson and Tavares 1998; Gartzke Li and Boehmer 
2001), and in recent studies in international business literature (Li and 
Vashchilko 2010; Duanmu 2014), how the global political structure, such as US 
hegemony, may influence bilateral investment flows between two countries 
remains an under-studied area that links Political Science and International 
Business theories. 
 
It is clear that US hegemonic power has gradually declined in recent 
decades. For example, the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) has 
demonstrated an ever-increasing converging position of China towards that of 
US in the course of last sixty years (Figure 2). Although China does not have 
the overwhelmingly military means that the US has, its growing economic 
power renders it a future threat to American hegemony. For example, the 
China’s One Belt, One Road project (丝绸之路经济带和 21 世) can be 
understood as an alternative to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (Ferdinand, 2016). Also, 
the project for the construction of the Nicaragua Canal (Meyer & Huete-Pérez, 
2014), financed by a Chinese company, could be interpreted as an alternative to 
the Panama Canal, under strong influence of US (Maurer & Yu, 2010).  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
Theoretically, we adopt the Soft Balancing concept, and hypothesize that 
China tends to locate less (more) investment in host countries which have strong 
(weak) political proximity with the US; we also contend that this tendency is 
stronger the larger the state control within the company. China’s OFDI provides 
us with a unique opportunity to assess empirically the influence of the US on 
the trajectories of emerging powers integration into the world economy, since 
Party–business relations increasingly influence decision-making processes and 
policy outcomes in the Chinese polity (Brødsgaard 2012; Naughton 2015). 
 
Our finding provides empirical substance to the notion that China used 
foreign investment as an economic diplomacy tool as suggested in Naughton 
(2008), Chan (2009), Bayne and Woolcock (2011), Nolan (2014) and Naughton 
(2015). We have attained supportive results using several sources of data and 
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different model specifications. Our results are robust to two falsification test, 
which we will discuss shortly.  
 
We contribute to empirical studies on political drivers of investment in 
general, and those on Chinese OFDI in specific. Our evidence regarding the 
strategic avoidance of Chinese investment in countries under strong US 
influence may not be generalizable to OFDI from countries at the global 
political periphery, but it does affirm a political economy view that considers 
the role of global political hierarchical structure on the economic expansion of 
large nations remains relevant, and could become more complex if US 
hegemony continues to decline, paving the way to a multi-polar political 
landscape in the future.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we 
outline the key literature on Chinese OFDI. We then build up our hypothesis 
integrating the soft balancing behaviour in international relations with the 
relationship between Chinese state control and political goals of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs). We explain our empirical strategy in the following section. 
The empirical results are then presented and discussed. We conclude the paper 
with theoretical reflections and policy discussions.   
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Political proximity between two countries is capable of affecting their 
foreign investment, which can in turn foster political proximity. According to 
Sauvant and Chen (2014), the Chinese government shifted from restricting to 
facilitating, supporting, and then encouraging OFDI. After the Going Global 
policy was formalized in March 2000 during the Third Plenum of the 9th 
National People’s Congress, in December 2001, the State Planning Commission 
(SPC) released the 10th FDI Five-Year Plan.  
 
Furthermore, in 2003, the Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council (SASAC) was established during the 10th 
National People’s Congress as a primary government institution responsible for 
managing the nation’s state-owned assets and leading the Chinese expansion 
abroad (Naughton 2008; Chan, 2009; Nolan 2014). State control over MNEs is 
expected to produce political outcomes. Politics driving FDI is more attainable 
in a country with 170 large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) controlled by a 
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single institution and access to public financing to expand abroad. As Naughton 
puts it “if we call the distinctive Chinese system that has emerged over the last 
three decades ‘state capitalism’, then SASAC is one of the key transmission 
belts in that system, since it is the institution through which the state manages 
its capital” (2015, 47). 
 
However, the institutional array is more complex than just the creation 
of SASAC and includes national banks, local and provincial institutions and 
special commissions (see Chen 2009 and Pearson 2015). As an illustrative 
example, in October 2004, China’s State Development and Reform Commission 
(SDRC) and the Export–Import (EXIM) Bank issued a circular to promote (1) 
resource exploration projects to mitigate the domestic shortage of natural 
resources, (2) projects that encourage the export of domestic technologies, 
products, equipment, and labor, (3) overseas R&D centers to utilize 
internationally advanced technologies, managerial skills, and professional 
contacts, and (4) mergers and acquisitions that could enhance the international 
competitiveness of Chinese enterprises, accelerating their entry into foreign 
markets.  
 
To stimulate these selected types of OFDI, the Chinese government 
offered firms preferential credit for these specifically promoted FDI (Luo, Xue 
and Han 2010, 76). Furthermore, through the nomenklatura system, the Party 
controls “the appointment of the CEOs and presidents of the most important of 
these enterprises and manages a cadre transfer system which makes it possible 
to transfer/rotate business leaders to take up positions in state and Party agencies” 
(Brødsgaard 2012, 624). As a result, “the Chinese political leadership, which in 
the 1990s viewed the SOEs as a problem to be fixed, now increasingly views 
the same firms as convenient instruments that can help in the achievement of 
national goals” (Naughton 2015, 67) 
 
Following the existing Political Economy literature, we assume three 
reasons that can explain how political proximity may directly affect investment: 
(a) by lowering information costs (Tesar and Werner 1995; Coval and 
Moskowitz 2001), (b) by reducing expropriation risk (Williams 1975; 
Acemoglu and Johnson 2005), and (c) by lowering bureaucratic barriers 
(Armstrong and Drysdale 2009; Drysdale and Armstrong 2010). In fact, these 
authors investigate whether bilateral political relations can explain investment 
and trade flows from the United States and find that countries experiencing 
deteriorating political relations with the United States exhibit lower FDI flows 
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into the United States and that the United States tends to invest less in unfriendly 
countries. 
 
It is likely that political proximity increased the ease and convenience of 
investing for Chinese MNEs because of the preferential policies established by 
the central government (Duanmu 2014). However, could political proximity to 
the US work as a deterrent for Chinese investment? The objective of our 
research is to build on the arguments of the abovementioned authors to 
determine whether political proximity to the US may act as a host-country 
deterrent of Chinese outward investment during the initial years of the ‘Going 
Global’ policy.   
 
The Hegemonic Stability Theory proposed by neo-realists suggests that the 
preponderance of power held by a state allows it to offer incentives, both 
positive and negative, to other states to agree to participation within a 
hegemonic order, thus creating international stability (Kindleberger 1986; Lake 
1993). This stable hegemonic order disappears, however, if another state grows 
strong enough to challenge the hegemon. Therefore, as time passes, the 
“distribution of power shifts, leading to conflicts and ruptures in the system, 
hegemonic war, and the eventual reorganization of order so as to reflect the new 
distribution of power capabilities” (Blum 2003, 247).  
 
China’s growth has sparked two opposing views on its geopolitical 
consequences. One view is that China is a growing security threat that could 
eventually challenge American geopolitical dominance, first in South East Asia, 
and later in other regions such as Africa and Latin America (Friedberg 2005; 
Sutter 2010; Kissinger 2012; Paz 2012). This line of argument sees China a new 
USSR, and hypothesizes a geopolitical order evolving to a proto-bipolarism and 
increasing Chinese business in Africa and Latin America as direct challenges to 
US global dominance.  
 
On the other hand, there is a view that poses that China is still preoccupied 
with securing a more comfortable and decent life for its people (Ikenberry 2008; 
Mingjiang 2008; Buzan 2010), and therefore its rise will continue to be 
pragmatic and economical driven, prioritizing domestic-development ends 
(Buzan and Cox 2013). From this perspective the Chinese power is seen as 
merely economic, thus scholars often compare it not with USSR but with the 
case of Japan in the 1980 s´ when its economic growth was thought to challenge 
US power but eventually the concern was vanished (Vogel 1979).  
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  The more recent “soft balancing” conceptualization offers an alternative-
and intermediate-explanation by stating that major powers, such as China, are 
likely to adopt actions that do not directly challenge US military preponderance 
but use non-military tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive 
unilateral US politics (see Pape 2005; Brooks and Wohlforth 2005; He and Feng 
2008). These tactics of soft balancing are intended to distract and wear down a 
dominant power rather than out-muscle it (Chan 2007).   
 
Although soft balancing may be unable to prevent the United States from 
achieving specific military aims in the near term, “it will increase the costs of 
using US power, reduce the number of countries likely to cooperate with future 
US military adventures, and possibly shift the balance of economic power 
against the United States” (Pape 2005, 10).  These characterizations converge 
with other scholars’ analysis. Swaine, Daly & Greenwood  argue that China’s 
foreign policy during this period was driven by a “calculative strategy”, 
characterized “by a non-ideological approach focused on market-led economic 
growth and the maintenance of amicable international political relations with all 
states, especially the major powers, to counterweigh the US dominance” (2000, 
2).   
 
China has, in theory, two ways to pursue its foreign policy goals: hard 
balancing or soft balancing. The former implies strengthening power through 
domestic military buildups or through external alliance formation. This is the 
traditional means of balancing also called military balancing. However, when 
two states enjoy a close economic relationship, hard balancing against each 
other would prove very costly for them. “Hard balancing will increase enmity 
and hostility between two states and consequently hurt economic ties and social 
well-being. High economic interdependence thus reduces the incentive for two 
states to hard balance each other” (He and Feng 2008, 375). When it comes to 
the US, with which it has an enormous economic interdependence (US is the 
main trading partner of China, and China holds an enormous portion of the 
former’s foreign debt), hard balancing may prove extremely costly.  “The other 
way for a state to increase its relative power is to undermine the power and 
constrain the influence of the threatening state without direct military 
confrontation” (He and Feng 2008, 372). This type of balancing behavior can 
be called soft balancing, and it is the object of our paper.  
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In the same direction, Goldstein argues that China has built a “Grand 
Strategy” to engineer the country’s rise to the status of a true global power that 
shapes, rather than simply responds to, current international system. To do so, 
it has been cultivating partnerships in an attempt to cope with the constraints of 
US power and to hasten the advent of an international system in which the US 
would no longer be so dominant. “Chinese spokesmen regularly emphasized 
that these partnerships were both a reflection of the transition to multi-polarity” 
(Goldstein 2001, 864), and an attempt to avoid the idea of bipolarism.   
 
The political economy view proposed here is not common in studies of 
OFDI, or specific studies on that from China, which have predominantly 
focused on economic, institutional, and geographic factors (e.g.  Liu, Buck and 
Shu 2005; Buckley et al., 2007; Morck, Yeung and Zhao 2008; Cheung and 
Qian 2009; Cui and Jiang 2012; Ramasamy, Yeung and Laforet 2012). 
Although a few studies have adopted a more political economy view, such as 
Duanmu (2014), they primarily develop their analytical framework in a bilateral 
context, namely, how the home-host country relationship influences investment 
flows, thereby ignoring how the global hierarchical political structure, i.e. US 
international dominance, may have influenced investment behaviour.  
 
We contribute to this gap by hypothesising that the global distribution of 
China’s OFDI should be such that countries under greater US political 
proximity will receive less investment because China uses FDI as a means for 
soft balancing. Such a strategy also enhances China’s ability to craft its own 
model of political and economic development, and to make itself “an attractive 
partner”, especially in a world in which the US is seen as an overbearing power 
(Zakaria 2011).  
 
Some examples of China’s strategy are its efforts to build “strategic 
partnerships” with main allies that involve trade, investment and scientific 
cooperation (see Lo 2004; Muekalia 2004; Sautenet 2007; Strüver 2014) and 
the soft-power approach in Africa, which has caught great academic attention 
(e.g. Alden, Large and De Oliveira 2008; Brautigam 2009). The first hypothesis 
of this paper is: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, the stronger (weaker) US political proximity the host 
country, the less (more) China’s OFDI that the country received during Going 
Global policy.  
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Chinese firms remain substantially influenced by the political agenda of the 
central government (Luo, Xue and Han 2010; Nolan 2014), although they are 
much more independent than they were forty years ago. State owned enterprises 
(SOEs) are particularly subject to political impositions because they usually 
operate as the spearheads of a developmental and geopolitical vision that 
emanates primarily from the central state (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011). We have 
mentioned the role that SASAC plays on SOEs as its the primary government 
institution responsible for managing the nation’s state-owned assets and leading 
Chinese expansion abroad (Naughton 2008; Nolan 2014). Consequently, 
SOEs—in and perhaps beyond China—often carry non-economic goals in their 
overseas investment (Ellstrand, Tihanyi and Johnson 2002), such as securing 
energy to fuel domestic economic growth (Urdinez, Masiero and Ogasavara 
2014), accessing advanced technologies, and increasing geopolitical influence 
(Gill and Reilly 2007).  
 
We believe that the Chinese government exerts its influence on SOEs 
through both positive incentives, such as those delineated in the Countries and 
Industries for Overseas Investment Guidance Catalogue, or the nomenklatura 
system and negative incentives. For instance, MOFCOM has sensitivity criteria 
for prohibiting investment that jeopardize bilateral diplomatic relations and/or 
violate bilateral agreements (Sauvant and Chen 2014, 145). In addition, 
“MOFCOM consults Chinese embassies or consulates in host countries, and 
investment are reviewed if the country was on a MOFCOM ‘blacklist’ or if the 
proposed investment would affect the interests of a third country” (Sauvant and 
Chen 2014, 147).  
 
In terms of positive incentives, SOEs often receive extensive support from 
the state government in their overseas expansion, including access to state 
finance and political protection for their operations in risky environments 
(Duanmu 2014). The political affiliation of SOEs with the state is likely to make 
their investment abroad much more sensitive to the host country’s relation with 
the US than in cases where the state does not impose its influence.  
 
By contrast, Chinese privately owned enterprises (POEs), although also 
under political influence, are usually driven by “institutional escapism” to avoid 
competitive disadvantages incurred by operating exclusively in the domestic 
market. This view suggests that POEs are sometimes pushed abroad because of 
a poor institutional environment at home, including rampant corruption, 
regulatory uncertainty, under-developed intellectual property rights protection, 
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and government interference, among other factors (Luo, Xue and Han 2010; 
Witt and Lewin 2008). This is in stark contrast with their state counterparts, 
which enjoy a variety of advantages, such as easy access to strategic resources, 
political support and finance, and monopolistic incumbent positions at home 
that can support their foreign expansion (Wei, Clegg and Ma 2014, 2).   
 
Having discussed in depth the literature, we formalize the second 
hypothesis as follows: 
    H2: The proposed relationship in H1 is stronger for firms with state control.   
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
We use both country and firm level data to investigate our hypotheses.  This is 
mainly driven by the fact that our country level data has certain limits and 
potential bias, which we will discuss shortly. By using firm level data as 
complements, we wish to establish robustness of our analysis with data as well 
as a method triangulation.  
 
3.1 Measurement of independent variables 
 
We proxy “Political proximity with US” with the share of common votes 
of the host country with the US on important issues at the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) (Dreher and Jensen 2013). The data was retrieved 
from the unclassified reports to Congress of the Department of State of the 
United States, and the criteria for differencing important from non-important 
votes was defined by the Department of State. We believe that important ones 
are those to which the State Department gave more importance, thus, they better 
reflect political alignments.  
 
   Gupta and Yu (2007) apply this proxy for political proximity and find a 
positive relationship between voting convergence and FDI flows from the 
United States and its partners. This variable has also been analyzed in other 
contexts, indicating a positive, statistically significant effect on the relationship 
between World Bank and IMF loans and countries whose voting patterns are 
more similar to G7 countries (Dreher and Sturm 2012). In addition, a 
statistically significant relationship is observed between larger amounts of 
financial aid from the United States and recipients that voted in line with the 
United States at the United Nations General Assembly (Dreher, Sturm and 
Vreeland 2009). Finally, Duanmu (2014) tests UNGA convergence with China 
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to test whether political proximity to China lead to a larger amount of Chinese 
investment. 
 
   To measure the degree of State control over each company, we used the 
Chinese state’s equity share, which can range from 0 to 100%. In our sample it 
has a mean of 25%. We used a dummy variable, which assumes the value of “1” 
if state equity is 50% or above, “0” otherwise. We use this dummy variable to 
make sure that we are measuring majoritarian state influence over a firm. 53% 
of our firm level observations have 50% state equity or above.    
 
   The selection of our control variables is primarily based on Duanmu 
(2014). We have included country-level variables: geographical distance, GDP, 
exchange rate, natural resource endowments, exports to China, political 
proximity to China and size of the Chinese diaspora in the host country, as well 
as year fixed effects. Firm level variables are age, profitability and total assets.  
 
   We outline the main rationales of these control variables in our 
estimation. For country level controls, domestic market size is the most 
commonly considered determinant of FDI and has proven to be a robust 
determinant across studies of Chinese FDI. A country with a large market likely 
attracts FDI, “as such investment promotes economies of scale in terms of 
production and distribution” (Blanton and Blanton 2007, 147). The proxy used 
to test for market size is the host-country’s GDP.   
 
Natural resources have been extensively discussed to be one of the 
motives of China’s outward FDI, although a more refined analysis shows that 
natural resources only matter in some resource-related industries (De Beule and 
Duanmu 2012). Literature typically used host-country exports of ores and 
minerals (Liu, Buck and Shu 2005; Buckley et al. 2007; Ramasamy, Yeung and 
Laforet 2012). We added to the exports of ores and minerals the export of oil 
and gas derivatives, as energy resources have proven to be key for Chinese FDI 
allocation (Urdinez, Masiero and Ogasavara 2014). 
 
 Furthermore, we control for the export dependence of other countries on 
China, measured by the ratio of the country’s export to China with its total 
export to the world. We draw export data from Trademap and Mongolia scores 
the highest with an average value of staggering 75% of export dependence on 
China during the period. Other countries heavily relying on the Chinese market 
as their export destination include Sudan (72%), North Korea (54%) and the 
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Democratic Republic of Congo (42%). A control for the exchange rate of the 
host country is considered because strong Yuan means greater purchasing power 
abroad, which could be another incentive for outbound investment (Cushman, 
1985). We also include geographic distance as a common controller in FDI 
models, despite its ambiguous impact on FDI (Carr, Markusen and Maskus 
2001).  
 
Finally, we included a control for the Chinese diasporas abroad. Literature 
has found that persistent ethnic networks effects can be explained by their 
functional capabilities such as promoting information flows (Bowles and Gintis 
2004). Additionally, we believe that the presence of Chinese ethnic networks in 
a host country may generate natural “legitimacy” for investors, who tend to 
cluster in countries/locations with their peers from the same home country, also 
called “country of origin agglomeration” because of the rich information flows 
as well as fertile collaboration opportunities (Tan and Meyer 2011). It is noted 
that we include the control for political relations with China, proxied with the 
convergence in votes at UNGA with China, since it is shown to be an important 
antecedent of Chinese outward FDI in Duanmu (2014).  
 
   Regarding the firm-level controls, we sought parent information from 
Global Business, GTA Information Technology, which is a commercial 
database company based in Hong Kong. We matched observations for which 
parent information was available and included controls for MNEs’ fixed assets, 
years in business and profit value scaled by number of employees. Past studies 
have demonstrated that these factors influence the decision and the scale of FDI 
(Asiedu and Esfahani 2001; Buch, Kleinert, Lipponer and Toubal 2005; 
Javorcik and Spatareanu 2005). The summary of key variables is presented in 
Table 1. A correlation matrix of the key variables is presented in Table 2.  We 
find no issue of multi-collinearity in our datasets. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
3.2 Dependent variables and model specification  
 
3.2.1 Country level data and estimation method 
 
Firstly, we retrieved country-level Chinese OFDI between 2005 and 2010 
from China’s Global Investment Tracker compiled by the Heritage Foundation 
(Scissors 2013). This is an open source database that excludes tax havens such 
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as Hong Kong, the British Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands and only 
considers final destinations rather than transit points of China’s OFDI. This has 
a significant impact on the estimates, as more than seventy percent of China’s 
OFDI goes to tax havens (Vlcek 2014; Buckley et al. 2015).  There are 66 
countries which have received positive amounts of Chinese FDI in this period, 
therefore we have constructed a balanced panel data for estimations.  
 
While data on FDI from OECD countries does not raise much concern, 
country-level databases on Chinese FDI is often subject to criticism as they are 
built not from governmental but from media reports, which can be problematic. 
Aware of this problem, the China’s Global Investment Tracker dataset controls 
for the quality of information. Our source allows to filter successful Chinese 
investment from failed ones, which were announced but were never completed. 
In this paper, we only include the projects where invested occurred.   
 
A drawback of this database is that it only includes investment larger than 
100 million US dollars. This threshold excludes hundreds of small investment, 
and results in over-representing large investment made. The amount of 
investment is strongly right skewed, with a mean amount of US$ 1777 million 
a year and a median amount of US$ 980 million.  
 
To address the drawback, we chose to use the number of investment per 
country in each year as the dependent variable, captures the country level 
extensive margin of FDI. Thus, we use a count variable and construct a balanced 
panel based on host countries and the time dimension. We use a panel Poisson 
specification with country and yearly fixed effects. The link of the panel Poisson 
function is log, the default for most statistical packages, and we do the 
interpretation of the coefficients observing percentage changes1. Our model can 
be written as follows: 
 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡,𝑘 =  𝛽0 +
𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑈𝑆𝑘,𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝑘=66
𝑘=1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘,𝑡 +
 ∑ 𝜔𝑦
𝑡=2005
𝑡=2010 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + ∑ ℎ𝑘
𝑘=66
𝑘=1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘  +  𝜀𝑘,𝑡    
 
    The equation models the annual number of projects in the host country k in 
the year t. The subscript k includes the following country-level controls: the 
Chinese diaspora in the host-country, the host-country’s GDP, the distance 
                                                          
1 We use Stata’s command spost13 developed by Long & Freese (2014). 
(1) 
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between Beijing and the host-country’s capital, the host-country exchange rate, 
the percentage of exports of the host-country to China and the country’s exports 
of minerals, metals and oil, as a proxy for natural resource exports. Since we 
cannot measure state equity at the country level, this country level model 
primarily focuses on H1. Therefore, the key interest is 𝛽1, which we expect to 
be statistically significant and negative to support our first hypothesis.  
 
 
3.2.2 Firm level data and estimation method 
 
To provide robustness to the results from the country-level model, and more 
importantly, to test the second hypothesis, we specify a firm-level model with 
cross sectional data of Chinese MNEs greenfield investment between 2005 and 
2010. The firm-level data was drawn from fDi Markets gathered by the 
Financial Times. It is comprised of 720 firm level observations in this six year 
period. The dependent variable here is the sum of invested capital by each firm 
in a particular year. This is the most direct way of capturing firm level FDI. The 
subscript k is comprised by the same controls as the country-level data model 
described in the previous paragraph. The subscript c includes the following 
firm-level controls: total assets, age and the annual profit per employee. Our 
firm level model can be expressed as follows:  
 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑘,𝑐,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑈𝑆𝑘,𝑡 +
  𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 ×
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑈𝑆𝑘,𝑐,𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝑘=115
𝑘=1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘,𝑡 +
∑ 𝛽𝑐
𝑐=720
𝑐=1 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑐,𝑡  +  ∑ 𝜔𝑦
𝑡=2005
𝑡=2010 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + ∑ ℎ𝑘
𝑘=115
𝑘=1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘 +
 𝜀𝑘,𝑐,𝑡    
 
We have 115 host countries in the sample. In this model, our key interest is 
𝛽3. We sought firm level control variables from Global Business, GTA 
Information Technology, a commercial database company based in Hong Kong. 
We use an OLS with robust standard errors specification in the estimation.   
 
Due to the fact that our data are drawn from two different sources, this has 
resulted in some sample attrition (number of observations from 875 to 261 in 
the full model, a reduction in 70%) that may not be random. We followed the 
same procedure as Duanmu (2014). First, to investigate potential bias, we used 
a simple t-test to check variables such as the amount of FDI and country-level 
controls. We found a small but systematic difference between the missing 
(2) 
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observations and the available observations. To correct for this bias we included 
zeroes in our database by creating a dyadic version of it, in which the dependent 
variable is dichotomous (1 if the MNE invested in the country on that year, and 
0 otherwise). We now discuss this “Dyadic” model.  
 
3.2.3 Dyadic data and estimation method 
 
Combining both previous datasets, we created a dyadic dataset that assumes the 
value of “1” when the Chinese MNE invests in a host-country, and “0” 
otherwise. This dataset allows us to combine country-level and firm-level 
controls, as well as to have zeroes in the database to control for potential 
selection biases of previous models. We employ a logit specification. Since the 
logit transformation allows for a linear relationship between the response 
variable and the coefficients, the coefficients in this model will be interpreted 
in terms of the log odds. The dataset is comprised of 9669 observations, and the 
model is specified as follows: 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑘,𝑐,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑈𝑆𝑘,𝑡 +
  𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 ×
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑈𝑆𝑘,𝑐,𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝑘=112
𝑘=1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘,𝑡 +
∑ 𝛽𝑐
𝑐=609
𝑐=1 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑐,𝑡  +  ∑ 𝜔𝑦
𝑡=2005
𝑡=2010 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 +  𝜀𝑘,𝑐,𝑡    
 
    The equation models the capital invested by each Chinese firm c in the host 
country k in the year t. The k term is an index for the host country. The subscripts 
c and k use the same controls as the models specified before.  
 
    It is noted that we use greenfield investment in both country level and firm 
level dataset, because it is more sensitive to political risk, official regulations, 
and political pressure than other types of FDI, such as mergers and/or 
acquisitions (Demirbag et al. 2008). In addition, greenfield was the main market 
entry choice by Chinese MNEs, approximately 60% larger than the money 
invested through M&As in our sample period (Wang and Lu 2016). We do not 
include FDI of other market-entry modes due to data unavailability. 
 
 
3.2.4 Robustness and Falsification tests 
 
Besides Models 1-3, we propose two robustness checks. The purpose of 
Models 4 and 5 is to provide robustness checks for our findings by using an 
(3) 
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alternative measure of state intervention over MNEs. Model 4 has the same 
specification as Model 2 –OLS specification, in which capital invested is the 
dependent variable. Model 5 has the same specification as Model 3, which uses 
a logit specification and a dummy variable for each investment as dependent 
variable, but the state equity is replaced as independent variable by company 
under the control of SASAC.  
 
In addition, we provide two falsification tests which aim to attest the 
causal mechanism between political proximity with US and Chinese allocation 
of FDI. Firstly we sought to use Taiwan as a counterfactual for the role of the 
Chinese Government in the decision-making of its MNEs. The idea is that to 
establish that Chinese FDI is deterred by US political dominance over the host 
country due to China’s unique political and economic position in the world, we 
need to demonstrate that in a “counterfactual” world this tendency would not 
exist if it were not for China’s unique political and economic position in the 
world. While a perfect counterfactual is difficult to find, we feel that Taiwan’s 
outward FDI in the same period might serve the purpose for two distinct reasons. 
  
Taiwan was separated from China in 1949 during the Chinese Civil War 
in which the Communist Party of China (CPC) took power of mainland China 
and forced loyal forces to the Kuomintang to base in Taiwan. CPS has claimed 
the legitimate government of all China since then. This means that had the 
political event not happened, Taiwan and China would have been one country. 
Secondly, despite inherited similarities between the two, they have distinct 
political regimes, and their relationship with the US follows very different 
trajectories. We use the proxy for political proximity with US data of Chinese 
votes in UNGA because Taiwan does not belong to this International 
Organization since 1971 when Resolution 2758 determined that PRC is “the 
only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations”. If we find that 
Taiwan’s FDI does not respond in the same way as China’s FDI to the US 
political dominance over the host country, then that would enhance our 
theoretical argument regarding the political mechanisms that explain the 
distribution of China’s FDI.  
 
Model 6 in Table 4 is specified as an OLS and the dependent variable is 
Taiwan’s yearly invested capital per country: 
 
(6) 
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𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑤𝑎𝑛′𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑘,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +
𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑈𝑆𝑘,𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝑘=27
𝑘=1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘,𝑡 +
 ∑ 𝜔𝑦
𝑡=2005
𝑡=2010 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + ∑ ℎ𝑘
𝑘=27
𝑘=1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘 +  𝜀𝑘,𝑡    
 
Secondly, we replaced the independent variable: US political proximity 
with that of Russia. We tested five models (7 to 11) as presented in Table 5, 
which are identical in specification and dependent variables to those in Model 
1 to Model 5. The idea is that athough Russia can be seen as a secondary actor 
in current global hierarchy, a couple of characteristics make it a suitable setting 
for this falsification test. First, it is a member of the UN Security Council, just 
like US and China. Second, it is a former communist country and a member of 
the BRIC, a key ally of China when it comes to confronting Western 
international regimes regarding human rights, authoritarian rule, and nuclear 
power. If the results based on Russia’s political relations are consistent with 
those where we treat US as the “hegemon”, then our theoretical arguments 
would be called in question. But if the results are inconsistent with those based 
on the assumption that US is the “hegemon”, that would then enhance our 
theoretical argument that it is US dominance that Chinese investors try to avoid. 
We proceed to discuss our results in the next section.  
 
 
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Table 3 offers the results of the three baseline models, country-level, firm-
level, and dyadic level data. In Model 1, the dependent variable is the number 
of greenfield investment per year at the country level. On average, each host 
country received less than a greenfield project a year (0.83) and only two 
countries received investment in every single year of the sample (Australia and 
Indonesia). The independent variable for political relations with US is 
statistically significant and has a negative coefficient of -0.020. The 
interpretation of the coefficients is made using percentage changes. This means 
that an increase of a percentage point in the political proximity of the host-
country with US translates into a decrease of 2% in the number of projects, 
ceteris paribus (Long & Freese, 2014). The results in Model (1) lends support 
to our first hypothesis: Chinese investors locate more investment projects in 
countries with low political proximity with the US.  
 
In Model 2, the dependent variable is the sum of capital invested by 
individual Chinese MNEs in million US dollars. The results lend support to the 
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second hypothesis, but not to the first one. The interactive variable between 
political proximity with US and state equity is statistically significant and has a 
negative coefficient (-4.77), but the coefficient of political relations with US 
loses statistical significance. It means that while the host country’s political 
distance with the US increases Chinese firms’ investment, this effect is only 
applicable for firms with majoritarian level of state equity. In our sample 71% 
of the capital invested was under the control of companies with majoritarian 
state control, which means that our hypotheses apply to a large portion of the 
sample. The magnitude of the effect can be observed in Figure 3. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 
In Model 3, the dependent variable is a dummy that assumes the value of 
“1” when the company invested in certain country-year, otherwise “0”. Once 
again, the interaction of the political proximity with US and the majoritarian 
State equity is statistically significant and reports a negative coefficient (-
0.0114). For each unit increase in the proximity with US, State control results 
in a 0.011 unit change in the log of the odds of a Chinese investment, holding 
all other independent variables constant. The log of the odds can also be 
transformed to odds-ratios (in this case OR= e0.011 = 0.98). So we can affirm that 
for a one-unit increase in political proximity with US, we expect to see about 2% 
decrease in the odds of the company investing in that country. 
 
From the standpoint of the literature of International Relations previously 
reviewed, these findings support the hypothesis that FDI is being used by the 
Chinese government as a soft balancing tool. Models 4 and 5 test an alternative 
measure for state control over the MNE: being under the control of SASAC 
(Naughton, 2008). The correlation of both State Equity in the MNEs and 
SASAC control in the sample is of 0.35. In the sample, 45% of the capital 
invested was through companies within SASAC. Model 4 has the same 
specification as Model 2 –and has an OLS specification–and Model 5 has the 
same specification as Model 3 –and has a logit specification–but the state equity 
is replaced by control of SASAC as independent variable. We confirm our 
hypothesis which gives robustness to our findings.   
 
This is a finding that concerns to a recently created domestic institution in 
China. As the literature has expressed, “SASAC might act as an institutional 
deterrent, the same way is the Countries and Industries for Overseas Investment 
Guidance Catalogue published by MOFCOM which has sensitivity criteria for 
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prohibiting investment that jeopardize bilateral diplomatic relations” (Sauvant 
and Chen 2014, 14).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
After establishing the main results, we assess the robustness of our 
findings through two different tests. The first is to use country level outward 
FDI data from Taiwan as “counterfactual” to that of China. We extracted 
Taiwan’s FDI data from UNCTAD. Taiwan has FDI in 27 countries in 2001-
2012. We constructed a country level balanced panel data. We find that US 
political dominance has no statistically significant effect on Taiwan’s FDI. The 
coefficient is positive but not statistically significant. The results are presented 
in Table 4.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
The second test that we performed was to replace the independent variable: 
US political proximity with that of Russia. The results are presented in Table 5. 
We basically replicated all estimations that we had in Table 3, but replaced the 
key independent variable, US political relations with that of Russia. We find 
that Chinese investment does not “soft balance” towards this secondary (but still 
relevant) actor in the international arena. The political proximity for Russia is 
actually positively related to Chinese investment at a firm level. These findings 
enhance our confidence in our theoretical argument.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
5 DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have provided theoretical arguments and empirical evidence of how 
political factors regarding the power distribution of the international system 
influenced Chinese firms’ investment. We find that distant political relations 
between the host and the US serve as an incentive to Chinese firms’ under strong 
State control willingness to invest. Our results have significant implications to 
theory and practice. The political economy view has not been considered in 
studies of OFDI from China, which have predominantly focused on economic, 
institutional, and geographic factors. We incorporate theoretical concepts from 
international relations theory to understand this under-explored phenomenon of 
international business.  If the United States retains its economic and military 
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primacy under unipolarity, maintaining the power gap with other powers, then 
it can continue to enjoy the luxury of a unilateral policy without worrying about 
hard balancing from others. The best other powers can do under unipolarity “is 
to attempt soft balancing to constrain US power rather than asserting a military 
challenge” (He and Feng 2008, 394) 
 
Our empirical findings give substance to soft balancing theory by 
demonstrating that major powers are likely to adopt actions that do not directly 
challenge US military preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, 
frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral US military politics. While 
previous studies find that political affiliation of SOEs with the central 
government has played an important role in facilitating SOEs’ overseas 
expansion (e.g. Duanmu 2014), this research demonstrates that the benefits do 
not come without expense. What is clear is that the visible hands of the Chinese 
government exert significant influence on its SOEs’ OFDI. Recent large 
infrastructure investments projects have shown the political variable to be 
highly relevant, as the projected transoceanic canal that crosses Nicaragua 
which is intended to compete with the Panama Canal (Daley 2016). 
 
China, furthermore, might be interesting in “buying friends” through FDI, 
and those countries with less influence by US might be the easiest to seduce 
with large infrastructure projects. An important implication of the results is that 
US global dominance has long been embedded in the current economic 
globalization commencing after WWII. But if the world political order were to 
change, i.e. US influence may decline as did United Kingdom’s after WWI, US 
influence on the distribution of FDI may diminish, which does not mean that we 
should not consider the political economy of globalization but that we should 
theorize how the new political order may replace the old regime and influence 
the trajectories of it.  
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Figure 1: Evolution of Chinese OFDI  
 
Note: US dollars at current prices and current exchange rates in millions.            
Source: UNCTAD. 
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Figure 2: Evolution of the CINC indicator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The CINC Score is a composite index that contains annual values for total population, 
urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and 
military expenditure, which proxies for total world power.Source: Correlates of War 
(2014).  Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution, 
Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) Peace, War, and 
Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48. 
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Figure 3. Effect of US’s political proximity on Chinese investment 
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics for the variables and their definitions 
Variables Measurement Source Mean SD. Min. Max. 
Country level       
Political relations with US Common votes with US in UNGA  US State Department 44.66 29.70 0 88.9 
Chinese diaspora Number of Chinese immigrants in host country (million people) World Bank 0.1912 0.6847 0 5 
Natural resources Host-country’s exports of minerals, metals and oil (million US$) Trademap 24.81 42.02 0 364.64 
Distance Air km between Beijing and foreign capital city (thousand Km) Online distance calculator 7100 3474 1091 19297 
GDP GDP in current million US$ World Bank 1144 1242 2.52 5495.3 
Exchange rate Real exchange rate (LCU per US$) IMF 1262 3886 0.49 18612 
Exports Percentage of export to China over total exports UN Comtrade 0.063 0.12 0 0.85 
Political relations with China Common votes with China in UNGA Voeten et al. (2009) 68.10 26.27 0 99.3 
Political relations with Russia Common votes with Russia in UNGA Voeten et al. (2009) 80.11 9.27 32.1 1 
       
Firm level       
Age MNE s´ number of years of operation This study 11.58 8.73 0 84 
Total assets Total fixed assets (billion Yuan) This study 23.2 2.89 15.5 30.09 
Profitability Profit per employee in Yuan This study 50.04 124.98 0.0001 1040 
State equity Company with more than 50% of equity controlled by the State This study 0.25 0.33 0 1 
SASAC control Company regulated by SASAC Szamosszegi and Kyle (2011) 0.13 0.33 0 1 
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Table 2 – Correlations matrix of key variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 State equity  1.00              
2 Political relations with US -0.02 1.00             
3 Total assets  0.21 -0.13 1.00            
4 Age 0.15 -0.12 0.24 1.00           
5 Exchange rate 0.02 -0.57 0.11 0.12 1.00          
6 Chinese diaspora -0.05 0.36 -0.16 -0.16 -0.26 1.00         
7 Political relations with China 0.09 -0.06 0.03 -0.07 -0.27 -0.17 1.00        
8 GDP -0.08 0.46 -0.19 -0.09 -0.40 0.64 -0.04 1.00       
9 Distance 0.01 0.30 0.02 0.07 -0.56 -0.18 0.27 0.07 1.00      
10 Exports  0.06 -0.20 0.10 -0.02 0.42 0.26 -0.12 -0.06 -0.55 1.00     
11 Profitability 0.12 -0.01 0.77 0.16 0.02 -0.11 0.00 -0.11 0.04 0.08 1.00    
12 Natural resources -0.11 0.19 -0.15 -0.07 -0.31 0.49 -0.03 0.77 0.12 0.04 -0.08 1.00   
13 SASAC control 0.35 -0.15 0.25 -0.02 0.06 -0.11 0.11 -0.11 -0.01 -0.03 0.14 -0.10 1.00  
14 Political relations with Russia -0.01 -0.70 0.17 -0.01 0.56 -0.40 0.15 -0.46 -0.30 0.16 0.08 -0.21 0.14 1.00 
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Table 3: Political Relations with US and China’s FDI 
 (1) (2)  (3)    (4) (5) 
 Country level Firm level  Dyadic level Firm level Dyadic level 
Political relations with US -0.020* -0.165  -0.0057 -2.25   -0.0076* 
 (-2.20) (-0.09)  (-1.42)    (-0.96)  (-2.03) 
State equity − 393.98***  0.320 − − 
 − (6.60)  (1.10)    − − 
State equity × political relations 
with US − -4.77*** 
 
-0.0114* − − 
 − (-4.02)  (-2.24)    − − 
Under SASAC control − −  − 224.98* 0.74 
 − −  − (2.40) (1.49) 
SASAC × political relations with 
US − − 
 
− -8.64** -0.032*** 
 − −  − (-2.96) (-3.15) 
Total assets − 0.129  0.00085 0.5207** 0.0012* 
 − (1.19)  (1.48)    (2.89) (2.04) 
Age − -1.88  0.0035 -0.106 0.0036 
 − (-1.49)  (0.65) (-0.07) (0.77) 
Annual profit − 5.94  0.049** 2.77 0.0511*** 
 − (1.58)  (2.95) (0.62) (3.41) 
Chinese diaspora -14.55 -545.2  -2.062***   -0.00037 -2.07*** 
 (-0.42) (-0.27)  (-3.71)    (-0.52) (-3.17) 
GDP 0.0014 -0.0005  0.00056***  0.2081 0.00056*** 
 (0.65) (-0.01)  (6.92)    (1.21) (6.27) 
Distance with China . 0.0055  -0.00005*   -0.150 -0.000047* 
 (.) (0.30)  (-2.52)    (-1.08)  (-2.43) 
Exchange rate 0.00038 -0.0008  -0.000042    0.169 -0.000043 
 (-1.65) (-0.14)  (-1.45)    (1.16) (-1.56) 
Political relations with China -3.21 95.82  -1.20**  -364.69 -1.239** 
 (-1.20) (1.06)  (-2.49)    (-0.67) (-2.75) 
Exports -1.29 -79.51  -1.21    -1339.21 -1.191 
 (-0.66) (-0.05)  (-1.43)    (-1.07) (-1.34) 
Natural resources -0.00773 0.439  0.0044***   -0.395 0.0044*** 
 (-1.76) (0.41)  (4.62)    (0.70) (5.15) 
Constant − 38.06***  -3.22**  2427.15 -3.028** 
 − (8.08)  (-2.79)    (1.45) (-2.77) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects − No  Yes No  
Adjusted R squared − 0.20  −                 0.17 −                 
Pseudo R squared 0.38 −  0.10    −                 0.10 
N 274 355  10138    376 10138 
Note: the table contains coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses.  
Significance values:* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
27 
 
 
 
Table 4: Robustness checks: Political Relations with US and Taiwan FDI 
 (6)    
 Country level 
Political relations with US -0.0798 
 (-0.24) 
Chinese diaspora -881.11 
 (-1.96) 
GDP 0.021 
 (0.31) 
Distance from Taiwan 0.0255 
 (0.19) 
Exchange rate 0.00385 
 (1.42) 
Political relations with China 61.58 
 (0.70) 
Exports 52.90 
 (1.23) 
Natural resources 0.0003 
 (0.00)    
Constant -333.04 
 (-0.23) 
Country fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
R squared 0.47 
N 352 
Note: the table contains coefficients and t-statistics in 
parentheses. Significance values:* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, 
*** p<0.001. 
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Table 5: A falsification test: Political relations with Russia and China’s FDI 
 (7) (8) (9)    (10) (11) 
 Country level Firm level Dyadic level Firm level Dyadic level 
Political relations with 
Russia 3.95 -1218.16 -2.874 -1395.64 -1.040 
 (1.14) (-1.85) (-1.22)   (-1.95) (-1.11) 
State equity −    -770.58* -1.425 −    −    
 −    (-2.05) (-1.22)    −    −    
State equity × political 
relations with Russia −    1236.7* 1.351 −    −    
 −    (2.25) (0.94)    −    −    
Under SASAC control −    −    −    131.51 -4.874* 
 −    −    −    (0.11) (-2.17) 
SASAC × political relations 
with Russia −    −    −    -69.02 5.490* 
 −    −    −    (-0.05) (2.06) 
Total assets −    0.0496 -0.0002 0.2624 0.00036 
 − (0.26) (-1.59)    (1.23) (1.29) 
Age −    -1.555 0.0044 0.1050 0.00116 
 −    (-0.94) (0.93)    (0.09) (0.23) 
Annual profit −    6.739 0.0866***     5.131 0.04844** 
 −    (1.76)  (6.08)    (1.26) (3.00) 
GDP 0.0013 0.1952 0.00043*** 0.1613 0.00029*** 
 (0.60) (1.71)  (5.72)    (1.39) (5.09) 
Distance with China . 0.647 -0.000079*** 0.7207 -0.000047* 
 (.) (1.44)  (-4.01)    (1.54) (-2.59) 
Exchange rate -0.00035 0.192 0.000031 0.176  0.000021 
 (-1.09) (1.00)  (1.35)    (0.82) (1.04) 
Political relations with 
China -5.13 -282.73 0.246    -292.51 -0.0292 
 (1.95) (-0.84)  (0.57)    (-0.77) (-0.08) 
Exports -1.44 -571.31 -0.479 -707.93 -1.285 
 (0.33) (-0.34)  (-0.70)    (-0.41) (-1.64) 
Natural resources -0.00000064 -0.7701 0.0064***  -0.189 0.0046*** 
 (-1.59) (-0.76)  (5.90)    (-0.18) (4.88) 
Constant . -5978.81 -8.921*** -6709.93 -3.44* 
 (.) (-1.29)  (-4.86)    (-1.40) (-2.71) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes No 
Industry fixed effects − No Yes No Yes 
Adjusted R squared − 0.37 −    0.31 −    
Pseudo R squared 0.38 − 0.08 −    0.07 
N 274 385 11108    378 12798 
Note: the table contains coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses.  
Significance values:* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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